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Strangers in a Strange Land: Foreign
Compulsion and the Extraterritorial
Application of United States
Employment Law
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasingly interdependent nature of the world economy has
made commonplace the overseas employment of United States citizens
by United States multinational corporations.1 When an American com-
pany employs a United States citizen in a foreign country questions arise
as to what extent the United States may regulate employment activity
taking place outside of United States territorial boundaries.2
Historically, principles of territoriality and nationality have con-
strained the ability of a sovereign state to prescribe conduct occurring
outside of its boundaries.3 Under traditional principles of jurisdiction,
1 In 1970 some 680,000 United States citizens worked overseas in private employment (exclud-
ing merchant marines). Social And Economic Statistics Admin., Bureau of the Census, United
States Dept. of Commerce, Americans Living Abroad (1973). Currently, about 2,000 U.S. Compa-
nies operate 21,000 foreign units in 121 countries. Were Civil Rights Meant to Travel? Bus. Week,
Jan. 21, 1991 at 36. As of November 1990 over 40,000 U.S. citizens were employed in Saudi Arabia
alone. Saudi Arabia's 'Guest Workers' Disenfranchised, Discontented, Chicago Trib., Nov. 25, 1990,
§ 1, at 5, col. 3.
2 See EEOC: Policy Statement on the Application of Title VII To American Companies Overseas
and to Foreign Companies, 401 Fair Empl. Prac. Rep. (BNA) 6063 (1988)[hereinafter Policy
Statement].
3 Jurisdiction to prescribe consists of a sovereign's authority to "apply its law, whether by stat-
ute, agency regulation, executive act, or judgment of a court, whether in general or in particular
cases." FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1315 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
In the past the jurisdiction of a state to make its law applicable in a transnational context was
determined by formal criteria derived from concepts of state sovereignty and power. In princi-
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 11:371(1990)
employee relations fell predominantly under the control of the local au-
thorities where the person or persons in question were employed.4 Juris-
dictional principles, however, have come to reflect the increasing
complexity of international business relations. Today, principles of rea-
sonableness and fairness supplement rigid concepts of territoriality.'
In some instances, the United States has expanded its jurisdiction
beyond traditional boundaries in order to protect the interests of its citi-
zens working overseas6 and to further domestic labor relations policies.7
As a result of these expansions, overlapping assertions of jurisdiction
have become common."
Under modem principles of jurisdiction, valid assertions of jurisdic-
tion by more than one nation may occasionally result in situations where
the law of one sovereign compels an employer to violate the law of an-
other.9 Such conflict has arisen where the United States claims jurisdic-
tion to prescribe overseas employment conduct, and another foreign
nation mandates discriminatory hiring practices,10 interferes with a col-
lective bargaining agreement,"1 or orders an employer to dismiss an em-
ployee without valid justification12 .
United States courts have long recognized the reasonableness of pro-
tecting a party from being caught between the law of the United States
and the law of foreign countries where the party does business.13 The
defense of foreign sovereign compulsion has evolved from this principle.
pie, it was accepted that a state had jurisdiction to exercise authority within its territory and
with respect to its nationals abroad.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 402 Intro-
ductory Note at 235 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
4 United States v. Veteo, 644 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1098
(1981). The RESTATEMENT provides that United States Laws may be applied to activities "related
to international transactions ... but not generally over predominantly local activities such as labor
relations of a foreign branch or subsidiary." RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 414 comment c at 271.
See generally infra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
5 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 402 Introductory Note at 236.
6 See Bryant v. International School Services, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472, 481-483 (D.N.J. 1980),
rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3rd Cir. 1982) (Title VII of Civil Rights Act interpreted to
apply extraterritorially); Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984 § 802(b)1,.29 U.S.C.A. § 623
(f)(1) (West 1985),(Age Discrimination in Employment Act amended to apply extraterritorially).
7 See Airline Pilots Association v.TACA International Airlines, 748 F.2d 965, 968 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985) (Collective bargaining agreement enforceable against cor-
poration moving from United States to El Salvador because, "collective bargaining agreements are
central to American labor law and are the essential threads of its fabric.")
8 REsTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 441 Introductory Note at 340.
9 Id
10 See Bryant, 502 F. Supp. at 487; infra notes 116-138 and accompanying text.
II See TACA, 748 F.2d at 971; infra notes 139-155 and accompanying text.
12 See McGhee, 871 F.2d at 1412; infra notes 156-168 and accompanying text.
13 See United States v. General Electric, 115 F. Supp. 835, 878 (D. N.J. 1953).
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Under this defense, a defendant may escape liability under United States
law if it shows that its actions, although in violation of United States law,
complied with the directives of a foreign government. 14
An employer may invoke the foreign compulsion defense in cases
where a foreign government forces the employer to treat its employees in
ways which violate United States law. 5 This comment develops a for-
eign compulsion doctrine applicable to employment disputes that ensures
fair treatment for both employers and employees subject to foreign laws.
In Part II, the comment focuses on the past application of the foreign
compulsion defense in United States courts, particularly in the area of
international antitrust law. This section analyzes the underlying nature
and rationale of the defense, concluding that the principle purpose of the
rule rests on an issue of fairness to the party subject to the conflicting
laws. Proper application of these fairness principles involves a two-step
process where the court must (1) determine whether the activity in ques-
tion was in fact compelled and (2) determine which nation's law has pri-
macy by invoking established principles of territoriality.
Part III applies principles developed in Part II in the context of
employment law disputes, recognizing that the interdependent nature of
an employer-employee relationship requires that the court consider the
effect of the compelled activity on both the employer and employee. The
application of these principles allows a defendant to escape liability only
when evidence shows that good faith compliance with the host country's
laws leaves no option but to violate United States law. This standard
limits the adverse effects of foreign government orders on American em-
ployees and employers by creating a rule of law which allows an em-
ployer to ex-ante limit its exposure to liability under United States law.
II. THE FOREIGN COMPULSION DEFENSE: GENERAL CONCEPTS
The doctrine of foreign sovereign compulsion has evolved as a prin-
ciple under international law to reduce the hardship placed on parties
caught between the conflicting demands of more than one nation. 6 Es-
14 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 441 at 234; Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texas Maracaibo,
Inc., 307 F.Supp. 1291, 1297 (D. Del. 1970).
15 Several courts have acknowledged the theoretical applicability of the defense in an employ-
ment law context. See TACA, 748 F.2d at 971; Bryant, 502 F. Supp. at 481-483; but cf. McGhee,
871 F.2d at 1419 ("Purposes of foreign compulsion doctrine normally are not implicated in cases
involving international contract disputes). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) has invoked the substance of the defense in one case. EEOC Decision No. 85-10, 2 Emp.
Prac. Guide (CCH) 6851, 7052 (1985) [hereinafter EEOC Decision]. The RESTATEMENT has also
recognized the potential applicability of the foreign compulsion defense to employment discrimina-
tion law. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 441 comment b at 234.
16 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 441 Introductory Note at 234. Section 441 reads:
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sentially, a party invoking the defense claims, "I did it, but I'm not guilty
because the government made me do it."1 7
The foreign compulsion principle originally arose as a defense
against the extraterritorial reach of United States anti-trust law.I"
Courts have accepted foreign compulsion as a theoretical defense to anti-
trust liability, and a defendant has successfully invoked the defense in
one reported case.19 More often, courts have acknowledged the defense
in dicta, stating that if a foreign government compelled the defendant's
conduct, the court could not impose liability.20 Provisions incorporating
the substance of the defense have also appeared in consent decrees. These
decrees exempt activity undertaken in a foreign country under the com-
pulsion of foreign law, which would otherwise violate provisions of the
Foreign State Compulsion
(1) In general, a state may not require a person
(a) to do an act in another state that is prohibited by the law of that state or by the law of
the state of which he is a national; or
(b) to refrain from doing an act in another state that is required by the law of that state or
by the law of the state of which he is a national.
(2) In general, a state may require a person of foreign nationality
(a) to do an act in that state even if it is prohibited by the law of the state of which he is a
national or
(b) to refrain from doing an act in that state even if it is required by the law of the state of
which he is a national.
17 Panel Discussion, The Sovereign Compulsion Defense in Antitrust Litigation: New Life for the
Act of State Doctrine, 72 AM. SOC. INT'L. L. PRoc.,- 97, 98 (1978)(Statement of Milo G. Coerper).
18 Maracaibo, 307 F.Supp. at 1297-98.
19 Id. Foreign compulsion has also been invoked as a defense against discovery orders and sanc-
tions which conflict with foreign nondisclosure laws. See Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S.
197 (1958). However, foreign compulsion as a defense to United States substantive law is concep-
tually distinct from application in a procedural context. Foreign non-disclosure statutes are often
specifically aimed at affecting litigation in United States courts and are usually not geared to advanc-
ing any affirmative policy of the foreign nation. Waller, Redefining Foreign Compulsion Defense in
US. Antitrust Law: The Japanese Auto Restraints and Beyond, 14 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 747, 781
(1982). Accordingly, somewhat less deference to the law of the foreign state may be called for.
REsTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 442 comment e. The RESTATEMENT, recognizing this distinction,
provides a separate rule for application of the defense in a procedural context. Section 441 concerns
conflicts in substantive law where both states have jurisdiction to prescribe the conduct in question.
Section 442 deals with the litigation process in situations where the forum state by definition has
jurisdiction over the parties and the proceedings and foreign substantive law would not ordinarily be
involved. See id. § 442 comment e. Although such a problem may arise in employment law litiga-
tion, the problem of foreign compulsion in this procedural context is beyond the scope of this
comment.
20 See In Re Japanese Products Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 315 (3rd Cir. 1983); In Re Uranium
Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1254-55 (7th Cir. 1980); Mannington Mills v. Congoleum, 595
F.2d 1287 (3rd. Cir. 1979); Timberlane v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 607 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985); Linseman v. World Hockey Association, 439 F.Supp.
1315, 1324 (D. Conn..1977); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc.,





A. Application of the Foreign Compulsion Defense
No clear guidelines exist which establish when foreign government
activity exempts a defendant from liability. At a minimum, established
precedents demonstrate that in order to successfully invoke a foreign
compulsion defense a defendant must show that (1) a foreign law truly
compelled the activity in question, and (2) the foreign nation's interest in
compelling that activity overrides any competing United States interest.
As explained below, courts have not agreed as to what constitutes either
a case of true compulsion or a sufficient foreign interest.
L The Requirement of Actual Compulsion
For a defendant to escape judgment in the United States it must
show that a foreign sovereign actually compelled the conduct giving rise
to liability under United States law. In the context of antitrust law
courts have held that knowledge, acquiescence, approval, or even encour-
agement of the illegal activity by the host government does not excuse an
antitrust violation.22
Courts have continuously recognized the theoretical validity of the
foreign compulsion defense, but have construed the requirement of actual
compulsion quite narrowly.23 Courts have addressed the foreign compul-
21 See United States v. Bechtel, 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,429, aff'd 749 F.2d 660 (9th
Cir.1979), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); United States v. United Fruit Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 62,458 (D.D.C. 1978). For a discussion of the role of foreign compulsion in consent de-
crees see, Waller, supra note 19, at 783. In addition the Antitrust Division of the United States
Department of Justice has recognized the validity of the defense. See U.S. Dept of Justice, Antitrust
Guide for International Operations (1988), reprinted in 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at S-
23 (Spl. Supp. Nov. 17, 1988) [hereinafter Antitrust Guide].
22 Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F.Supp. at 1296-1299. In Maracaibo, the plaintiff, an oil refiner, alleged
that the defendants, exporters of low cost Venezuelan crude oil, refused to supply them with oil in
violation of the Sherman Act. The defendant claimed that the Venezuelan government had ordered
them not to sell oil extracted from its territory to the plaintiff. Finding nothing in the evidence
which indicated that defendants either procured the Venezuelan order or acted voluntarily pursuant
to a delegation of authority to control the oil industry, the court concluded that the undisputed facts
demonstrated that defendants were compelled by regulatory authorities in Venezuela to boycott
plaintiff, and held that such compulsion acted as a complete defense against liability under United
States antitrust law. Id. at 1296. No other court has explicitly invoked foreign compulsion as a
defense to antitrust liability. But see O.N.E. Shipping v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 830 F.2d
449 (2d. Cir. 1987) cert denied 485 U.S. 486 (1988) (Court invoked combination act of state doctrine
and foreign compulsion). See supra note 34 (Discussion of the merger of act of state and foreign
compulsion).
23 For example, in Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1293-1294, the mere issuance of patents by a
foreign government did not force the defendant to exclude the plaintiff from foreign markets, and
therefore did not represent "actual" compulsion. Moreover, in Linseman v. World Hockey Associa-
tion, 439 F.Supp at 1324, a preference of the Canadian government that the professional hockey
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sion defense on a case by case basis resulting in the absence of a clear rule
of law delineating what constitutes "actual" compulsion sufficient to ex-
empt a defendant from liability under United States law.24
According to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States, a court may find compulsion whether the require-
ment or prohibition is backed by criminal or civil liability, or both.25
Generally, a defendant may only invoke the defense when the foreign
state embodies the requirement in binding laws or regulations subject to
penalty or other severe sanctions and not when the foreign state gives the
orders in the form of "guidance," or informal communications.26 How-
ever, if informal communications create a justifiable fear of sanctions, the
communications may prove adequate to create compulsion.27 The threat
of termination of valuable business arrangements may give rise to the
foreign compulsion defense, but denial of opportunity for new arrange-
ments probably would not.2" For the defense to succeed it is not enough
to show that the foreign government licensed or tolerated the activity at
issue,29 gave an exclusive franchise to the corporation,30 or even that a
foreign-owned entity participated31.
The scope of inquiry used to determine whether the activity in ques-
tion actually constitutes compulsion is very narrow. As a general rule, a
United States court may not consider the validity of the foreign govern-
ment order under the foreign law.32 The act of state doctrine precludes
an American court from inquiring into the validity of a foreign sover-
draft not apply to amateurs under the age of twenty did not compel an agreement among the league
teams not to draft players under the age of twenty, and therefore did not exempt that agreement
from antitrust laws. Finally, a claim made by a foreign government before the court that the act
under adjudication was compelled by that government will not exempt a defendant from liability.
See In Re Japanese Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d at 315 (Note from Japanese ministry
indicating that alleged restraints were required by law insufficient to prove compulsion); In Re Ura-
nium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d at 1254 (Amicus brief from Canadian Government alleging that
it compelled private restraint in American Uranium trade held insufficient).
24 Waller, supra note 19, at 786.
25 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 441 comment c at 342.
26 Id. For a discussion of the role of foreign government statements see Comment, The Sover-
eign Compulsion Defense in Antitrust Actions and The Role of Statements by Foreign Governments, 62
WASH. L. REv. 129 (1987).
27 See, e.g., Maracaibo, 307 F.Supp. at 1296-1299. In Maracaibo compulsion was found by the
court based on statements made by a Venezuelan Official.
28 RESTATEMENT § 441 COMMENT C AT 340.
29 Id. See also In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d at 1254.
30 Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1293-1294.
31 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 441 comment c at 342; Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1294.
See also supra note 23.
32 The court in Maracaibo refused to consider the affidavit of a Venezuelan attorney that the
order which led to the compelled activity was issued without authority under Venezuelan law on the
grounds that such an inquiry was beyond the scope of its powers. 307 F.Supp. at 1301.
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eign's actions. Under the act of state doctrine, United States courts must
reject private claims that are based on the contention that the act of an-
other nation violates either American or international law.33 The act of
state doctrine relates to the foreign compulsion defense to the extent that
when a nation compels a private firm to engage in a certain activity,
"[a]cts of business become effectively acts of the sovereign."34 The inter-
play between the act of state doctrine and the foreign compulsion defense
limits the factual inquiry in a potential case of foreign compulsion to the
existence of the foreign order. Once a defendant shows governmental
action, further examination into the nature of that action is neither neces-
sary nor proper.35
A finding that the activity in question was actually compelled means
that the defendant could not obey United States law without breaking the
law of a foreign sovereign. In such an instance the court must determine
which law prevails. This comment now turns to a discussion of the fac-
tors a court should consider when deciding whether the law of the for-
eign sovereign will take precedence over United States law.
2. Foreign Interest and the Principle of Territoriality
A court forced to resolve a case of foreign compulsion is placed in a
very delicate position because, by definition, foreign compulsion occurs
when both nations have legitimate claims to jurisdiction over the conduct
in question. In the case of true compulsion a court order to enforce
United States law, to at least some extent, will violate the sovereignty of
another nation. For this reason, a court can only apply United States
law when the United States has a stronger claim to jurisdiction than the
33 Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1292. Originally the act of state doctrine was based on princi-
ples of sovereignty and dignity of independent nations which precluded American courts from sitting
in judgment of the acts of a foreign sovereign. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252
(1897). The modern doctrine is based on a separation of powers analysis and the need to give the
executive branch deference in matters of foreign policy. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964). Whatever its theoretical foundation, by precluding inquiry into the valid-
ity of a foreign governments acts the doctrine requires American courts to reject private claims based
on the contention that the damaging act of another nation violates either American or international
law. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1292 (Discussion of the evolution of the act of state doctrine
and its relationship to foreign compulsion). See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of relationship between foreign compulsion and act of state.
34 Maracaibo, 307 F. Supp. at 1298. This phrase has caused some courts to merge the two
doctrines. See, eg., O.N.E. Shipping, 830 F.2d at 453. However, most have recognized foreign
compulsion and act of state as similar, but conceptually distinct. See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at
1293. For an in depth discussion of the conceptual distinction between the two doctrines see infra
notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
35 Mararaibo, 307 F. Supp. at 1298. See also Hawk, Special Defenses and Issues, 50 ANTrrRusT
L.J. 559, 571 (1982); Panel Discussion, supra note 17, at 101 (Remarks of M.R. Joelson).
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other country. Because of the inherent difficulty of resolving conflicting
jurisdictional claims, authorities do not agree on the appropriate method
for resolving this conflict.36
The RESTATEMENT explicitly recognizes that the traditional juris-
dictional limitation of territoriality determines which law will prevail in a
given situation.37 According to the RESTATEMENT, territoriality oper-
ates as the principle of preference between conflicting exercises of juris-
diction.38 In other words, a court should give preference to the law of
the nation in which the activity is to be done.
The RESTATEMENT recognizes, however, that this territorial prefer-
ence is not absolute.3 9 Often the conduct in question may take place in
more than one sovereignty.' Additionally, cases may arise where the
conduct abroad has direct effects in both the United States and the host
country, or is so egregious that it is reasonable for the United States to
insist that the person desist from such conduct, even if it requires the
entity to leave the host nation.4 1 Under principles of fairness, the state of
nationality may reasonably regulate the conduct of its nationals overseas
more broadly when the conduct or activity has not yet begun, since com-
pliance with such regulations should prove less burdensome than would
compliance with regulations that conflict with the host nation's com-
mands concerning activity already undertaken.42
Absent unusual circumstances, courts should adhere to principles of
territorial sovereignty. The power of a sovereign to control activity in-
side of its borders is an undisputed principle of international law.43 Ex-
36 Some courts have advocated a comity analysis which balances the interests of the two nations.
See TACA, 748 F.2d at 911. Other courts and commentators have based the defense on more ex-
pansive principles of territoriality. See Maracaibo, 307 F. Supp. at 1296-1299; Hawk, supra note 35,
at 571. Most courts have avoided the issue by finding that the activity in question was not actually
compelled. See supra note 23.
37 See supra note 16.
38 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 441 comment a (A state may not absent unusual circum-
stances, require a person, even one of its nationals, to do abroad what the territorial state prohib-
its.... [Tihe territorial state may in principle exercise its authority over any person, including a
foreign national, even in the face of a conflicting law of the state where he is a national).
39 Id
40 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 441 comment c at 342. For example, the court in Maracaibo
accepted the defense when the activity prohibited by foreign law (the delivery of oil to the plaintiff)
occurred outside of the foreign state. 307 F.Supp. at 1296.
41 Such a situation may easily arise in antitrust or discovery request cases because the conduct
occurring in the foreign state often has the primary purpose of affecting either markets or litigation
within the United States. cf Maracaibo, 307 F.Supp. at 1296 (Foreign compulsion applied where
conduct had effects in United States). In employment law cases, justification for an exception to
territoriality may not be as strong. See infra notes 103-114 and accompanying text.
42 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 441 comment d at 343.
43 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 402 comment c at 343. ("The territorial principle is by far
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traterritorial jurisdictional principles, although justified in some
circumstances, rest on more questionable doctrinal grounds.' While
under modem doctrines certain situations may dictate extraterritorial ju-
risdiction, it cannot be appropriate when it would force a party to diso-
bey a territorial sovereign in order to comply with United States law.
The justifications underlying this principle make up the subject of the
next section.
B. Justifications for the Defense
The primary reason for the inconsistent application of the defense
stems from an inability of courts and commentators to agree on an un-
derlying rationale for the defense. The policies underlying the foreign
compulsion defense have received considerable scrutiny, particularly in
the area of antitrust law.45 Commentators have discovered as many as
five rationales supporting the defense in the context of antitrust law.46
Three of these rationales-the act of state doctrine, international
comity, and fairness-have been used to justify the application of the
defense in employment law.47 A careful analysis of the important policy
considerations underlying the doctrine show that while all three ratio-
nales may justify application of the defense in some instances; the pri-
mary justification of general applicability is one of fairness to the
defendant.
1. Act of State Doctrine
Probably the most commonly cited rationale for the foreign compul-
sion defense comes from a direct extension of the act of state doctrine.
The act of state doctrine represents a principle of law designed primarily
to avoid judicial inquiry into the affairs, policies, and motives, underly-
the most common basis for the exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe, and it has generally been free
from controversy").
44 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 402 comments d, e at 239-40.
45 See Waller, supra note 19, at 788; Antitrust Guide, supra note 21; Comment, supra note 26;
Panel Discussion, supra note 17; Hawk, supra note 35, at 971.
46 See Waller, supra note 19, at 788; Comment, supra note 26, at 134-144. These rationales
include, fairness to the defendant, extension of the act of state doctrine, international comity, statu-
tory construction of the Sherman Act, and analogy to the antitrust state action doctrine.
47 See McGhee, 871 F.2d at 1419 (act of state doctrine as justification); TACA, 748 F.2d at 971
(comity analysis); EEOC Decision, 2 Emp. Prac. Guide at 7052 (fairness analysis). The two other
rationales, statutory construction of the Sherman Act, and analogy to the state action doctrine, deal
specifically with substantive antitrust law and hence are at most marginally relevant to a discussion
of the defense in an employment law context. For a discussion of these rationales see Waller, supra
note 19, at 788, 792; Comment, supra note 26, at 134-136, 138-139.
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ing the actions of a foreign government.4" Many courts conceptually link
the act of state doctrine and foreign compulsion defense. Several cases
have reflected the notion that foreign compulsion is no more than a "co-
rollary of the act of state doctrine."'49
A comparison of the two doctrines shows that although interrelated,
both have conceptually different justifications. Similarity exists in the
fact that both preclude inquiry into the validity of sovereign acts. Be-
yond this restriction, however, the policy concerns underlying each doc-
trine are distinct. The act of state doctrine, based on separation of powers
principles, represents a judicial formula reflecting deference to the execu-
tive branch, which courts presume is better qualified to handle the diplo-
matic and political consequences of an act of state. Foreign compulsion,
on the other hand, represents a substantive defense based on the theory
that the defendants engaged in illegal activity only because a foreign sov-
ereign compelled them to do so.50
The foreign compulsion defense is distinct from the act of state doc-
trine because the inability of an American court to inquire as to the valid-
ity of foreign governmental act does not in and of itself justify releasing a
private plaintiff from liability. Nothing in the act of state doctrine pre-
cludes a court from deciding to subject a private defendant to liability
and let the defendant choose which master to follow. The question that
the court must ask in a foreign compulsion analysis is whether the al-
leged compulsion, valid or invalid, actually occurred.5 1
Out of a sense of fairness, when a court finds actual compulsion, the
court may exempt the defendant from United States law. The act of state
doctrine acts as a presumption preventing the adjudication of a foreign
sovereign's acts and therefore functions not as a direct justification for
the foreign compulsion defense, but merely as a restriction under which
American courts must operate when evaluating the legitimacy of a for-
48 O.N.E. Shipping, 830 F.2d at 452.
49 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 606. See also Linseman, 439 F.Supp. at 1324; Phoenix Canada Oil
Co., Ltd., v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445, 459 n.61 (D. Del. 1978) ("The essence of the [foreign]
compulsion defense is that an act performed within a foreign country under the direct mandate of a
foreign authority represents the de facto action of the sovereignty."). Part of this confusion has
resulted from cases where the defendant is partially owned by a foreign government. In these cases
courts have tended to merge the two doctrines completely. See O.N.E. Shipping, 830 F.2d at 453
("where as here, the conduct of the appellees has been compelled by the foreign government they are
entitled to assert the defense of foreign government compulsion and the act of state doctrine is
applicable.")
50 Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defenses: Transnational Boycotts & Economic
Coercion, 55 TEx. L. Ruv. 1, 20-21 (1977).





Principles of international comity provide another commonly cited
rationale given for the foreign compulsion defense. International comity
consists of that body of rules which states observe towards one another
from courtesy or mutual convenience, although they do not form part of
international law.5" Under a comity analysis a court balances such fac-
tors as the vital interests of the two nations, the potential hardship to the
defendant, the nationality of the defendant, the location of the conduct,
and the ability of each nation to enforce its legal norms.54 Several courts
have utilized such a balancing approach in evaluating the validity of a
foreign compulsion claim.55
Consideration of comity principles has long been considered appro-
priate any time the extraterritorial application of United States law is
involved.56 Courts and commentators have advocated the use of comity
principles when deciding whether to exert jurisdiction over extraterrito-
rial activity.
57
Although principles of international comity support the use of the
foreign compulsion defense,58 direct invocation of comity principles fails
to assist a court in deciding when the defense should apply in a particular
case. A court's ability to balance appropriate factors on a case by case
basis has been severely questioned.59 First of all, a court attempting to
measure and compare the interests of sovereign nations under a comity
analysis engages in the type of political analysis foreclosed under the act
52 Moreover, the validity of the act of state doctrines in cases involving private defendants has
been questioned. See Waller, supra note 19, at 791. The act of state doctrine is a creature of public
international law, and cannot be translated to issues which concern the rights of individuals. See
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). The dilemma facing a
corporation subject to conflicting laws is a subject commonly thought to be the province of private
international law which refers to the transnational and foreign laws which govern the behavior of
individuals and private entities such as corporations.
53 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
54 Waller, supra note 19, at 787.
55 See TACA, 748 F.2d at 971. Courts have acknowledged as many as ten factors to consider in
balancing jurisdictional interests. See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297; Timberlane, 549 F.2d at
614.
56 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 402.
57 Note, Predictability and Comity, Toward a Principle of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 1310 (1985).
58 See Comment, supra note 26, at 142; For instance the territorial limitations on the defense
may be rationalized under comity principles, because international comity recognizes the importance
of territorial sovereignty.
59 Id. See also Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d 909, 948-952 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
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of state doctrine.' Second, balancing relevant factors on a case-by-case
basis robs the process of any certainty.61 Therefore, a comity analysis
does not offer guidance in business planning for a firm facing potentially
conflicting government orders.62 A court determining the validity of a
foreign compulsion claim must ascertain when a corporation has no
choice but to violate United States law. 3 The formation and application
of a-priori rules better achieves this goal."
Principles of comity only answer the question: Why should defer-
ence be given to foreign law in instances where the foreign compulsion
defense applies? It cannot answer the equally important question: When
should the defense apply? Situations where the foreign compulsion de-
fense should apply occur when the balancing of comity principles fails to
solve the jurisdictional dispute.65 By definition, the foreign compulsion
defense applies when both nations possess a valid interest based on ac-
cepted jurisdictional principles,66 both nations have the power to enforce
their legal norms,17 and the laws of the foreign state leave no choice but
to violate the law of the United States68. Absent true compulsion, both
states maintain valid jurisdiction and the corporation should be able to
follow the mandates of both states without undue hardship. 9 In cases of
potential compulsion, the potential hardship on the private defendant
created through enforcing American laws represents the only unac-
counted comity factor.7 0 Although comity principles support the use of
the defense, the balancing of comity principles as a means of analyis in
individual cases obscures the essential question in cases of potential for-
eign compulsion: When is it unfair to make a private defendant submit
to the laws of both nations?
3. Fairness to the Defendant
Fairness to the private defendant represents the most obvious reason
60 Comment, supra note 26, at 141. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
61 See Laker, 731 F.2d at 948-952.
62 See Waller, supra note 19, at 787.
63 See supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
64 Comment, supra note 26, at 142.
65 Laker, 731 F.2d at 952 ("There is, therefore, no rule of international law holding that a 'more
reasonable' assertion of jurisdiction mandatorily displaces a 'less reasonable' assertion of jurisdiction
as long as both are... consistent with the limitations imposed by international law.").
66 See REsTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 441 Introductory Note.
67 If the nations did not have power to enforce their legal norms, the problem of compulsion
would not exist.
68 See supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
69 See Laker, 731 F.2d at 952.
70 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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for allowing the foreign compulsion defense. Fairness requires that pri-
vate parties should not be subject to conflicting demands of different sov-
ereigns. Without the protection of a foreign compulsion defense,
enterprises would frequently find themselves stuck in the unenviable po-
sition of either violating the law of one or more nations, or ceasing to do
business in one of the nations.71 The courts,72 the RESTATEMENT, 7 3 and
numerous commentators recognize the importance of fairness74 .
The foregoing discussion of the act of state doctrine and comity
principles supports the primacy of fairness considerations in foreign com-
pulsion analysis. Each of the rationales discussed above provides some
basis for the foreign compulsion defense, but fails to adequately justify
the defense in and of itself. The act of state doctrine tells us why in some
cases deference should be given to foreign governments, but does not ex-
plain why an individual defendant subject to conflicting laws should be
released from liability in the United States.7 5 Similarly, comity principles
justify deference to the law of a foreign sovereign in some instances, but
do not help a court determine when a case of actual compulsion has oc-
cured.76 As a result, neither the act of state doctrine nor international
comity can adequately serve as a rule of law which justifies a decision to
exempt a private defendant from liability in a particular case.
a. Failure of Current Doctrine
Because courts have obscured the fundamental importance of fair-
ness to the defendant in past analysis of the foreign compulsion defense,
past application of the defense has fallen far short of fulfilling the goal of
fairness. Inconsistent application has resulted in the absence of legal cer-
tainty. The promotion of certainty and predictability should stand as the
first goal of a fair doctrine.7 7 International businesses require knowledge
of which acts may create liability.78 If the doctrine's goal is to protect
71 Maracaibo, 307 F. Supp. at 1298.
72 Id.
73 Supra note 3, § 441. The importance of fairness to the defendant is demonstrated throughout
section 441. Section 441, comment a, specifically states that "This section applies [principles of
preference] to protect persons caught between conflicting commands."(emphasis added). Similarly
the Introductory Note to the chapter on foreign state compulsion states: "International law has
developed principles to reduce the severity of the dilemma for affected persons."
74 Waller, supra note 19, at 787; Comment, supra note 26, at 143; Hawk, supra note 35, at 571.
75 Supra note 48-52 and accompanying text.
76 See supra note 65-70 and accompanying text.
77 See Note, supra note 57, at 1319-1323.
78 Comment, In Re Japanese Products Antitrust Litigation: Sovereign Compulsion, Act of State,
and the Extraterritorial Reach of United States Anti-trust laws, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 721, 749-750
(1987).
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the defendant caught between two sovereigns, at the very least a rule of
law must be developed which will give a multinational corporation an
opportunity to determine a priori if true compulsion exists. 7 9 Fairness
requires that courts adopt a rule of law which allows a party to comply
with the foreign government mandate in a manner which limits potential
liability under United States law.
Section 441 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States, adopted in 1987, represents a needed yet ultimately
inadequate step toward certainty and fairness in the doctrine of foreign
compulsion. 0 The territorial guidelines, as adopted by the REsTATE-
MENT, exists as an important component of a fairness analysis."1 Fair-
ness requires that parties subject to direct coercion from foreign
governments should not be subject to United States law which conflict
with the orders of that government.
In other respects, the RESTATEMENT suffers from the same basic
flaw as the case law on which it is based; namely, it fails to provide ade-
quate guidelines to determine when a case of foreign government com-
pulsion actually exits, and therefore fails to fulfill the fundamental goal of
fairness. Current doctrine, as embodied in the RESTATEMENT, reflects a
misguided concern over the form rather than substance of the alleged
compulsion. Rather than providing a rule of law to apply, the RESTATE-
MENT merely lists various factual scenarios which may give rise to the
defense. Scholars have criticized this placement of form over substance
of compulsion as failing to promote fairness.8 2
An example of the RESTATEMENT'S misguided concern over the
form of the alleged compulsion is the suggestion that compulsion may
usually only come in the form of binding laws or regulations.83 Any doc-
trine designed to promote fairness must recognize that foreign compul-
sion may occur through methods which fall short of binding rules and
regulations. Other countries often effectuate their policies through infor-
mal understandings." "Courts must be aware that, in the present so-
phisticated international business system, government control over its
industries, both public & private comes in many forms."85 Unlike the
79 Comment, supra note 26, at 142.
80 See supra note 16.
81 Comment, supra note 26, at 144.
82 Wailer, supra note 19, at 798; Hawk, supra note 35, at 571.
83 See supra note 3, § 441 comment c.
84 Wailer, supra note 19, at 749, citing Statement of Ministry of Inter. Trade (MITI) in, Brief of
Govt. of Japan as Amicus in support of cert. pet. in Re Japanese Products Antitrust Litigation, 723
F.2d 238 (3rd Cir. 1983)(Describes tacit understanding between ministry and business that failure to
comply with export price directive would lead to sanctions).
85 Comment, supra note 78, at 750.
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conflicts between regulated and free market society in the United States,
many countries operate under a system of close informal cooperation be-
tween business and government. 6
These fairness concerns, as well as inherent limitations on the power
of United States courts, prevent an inquiry into the validity or form of a
foreign government order. Requiring a valid sovereign act in the form of
binding law as a prerequisite to the compulsion defense would require a
United States court to render an opinion as if it were a court in that
country. 7 The act of state doctrine clearly forecloses such an analysis.8 8
Moreover, practical considerations prevent such an inquiry; if courts of a
foreign nation had not definitively passed on the question at hand, Amer-
ican courts would have no basis for their decisions.8 9
The difficulty courts face in determining the validity of a foreign
government order pales in comparison with the plight of a private party
who must decide whether or not to comply with a foreign command. A
private party unfamiliar with the laws and customs of the host country
may have no way to ascertain the ultimate validity of the order. Addi-
tionally, the mere fact that the foreign government claims its order to be
valid may not prove dispositive in a United States court.9 0 At best, a
private party can comply in good faith with a government order which it
reasonably believes valid. For this reason, the validity of a foreign gov-
ernment order should only prove relevant as evidence that the defendant
acted in good faith in obeying the foreign government order.9 1
b. Good Faith Standard.
Fairness requires that courts consider the plight of corporations op-
erating under the unfamiliar laws of foreign lands. For this reason a
court should invoke the foreign compulsion defense if the defendant can
prove that the violation of United States law resulted from an attempt at
good faith compliance with the law of the host nation.92 Such a rule
would provide relief to deserving defendants while insuring that foreign
compulsion is not invoked as a pre-text for otherwise illegal behavior.
Such a good faith standard has precedent in the Uniform Commer-
86 See Griffine, A Pr'mer on Extraterritoriality, 13 INT'L. Bus. L. 23, 25 (Nov. 1985).
87 Wailer, supra note 19, at 807.
88 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
89 Waller, supra note 19, at 807.
90 Even when a foreign government has specifically stated that an order giving rise to alleged
compulsion was valid, United States courts have refused to accept the defense. See Japanese Prod-
ucts, 723 F.2d at 315; Uranium Antitrust, 617 F.2d at 1254; supra note 23.
91 Waller, supra note 19, at 809.
92 I"d'
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cial Code which excuses non performance of a contract if a party proves
"compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign ... governmental
regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid." 93 A test
requiring good faith compliance would bring a measure of certainty and
finality to business decisions, and is consistent with the act of state doc-
trine and the need for respect for the decisions of foreign sovereigns.
Under a good faith compliance test a court would limit its inquiry to
whether the defendant knew, or could reasonably have known, that the
foreign compulsion was invalid. Courts could apply the good faith stan-
dard regardless of the form which the compulsion takes, thereby taking
into account situations where foreign nations create compulsion through
informal government acts.
The good faith standard, because it rests on the general principle of
fairness, has potential application in many instances where a party con-
fronts conflicting substantive laws. So far this comment has discussed
foreign compulsion as a concept independent from any particular area of
substantive law. The next section discusses foreign compulsion as a de-
fense to liability under United States employment law.
III. FOREIGN COMPULSION AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Introduction
United States employment laws, when applied to employers doing
business in other nations, may conflict with the laws of the host nation.
When such a situation occurs a foreign compulsion analysis is appropri-
ate.94 Defendants have attempted to invoke foreign compulsion as a de-
fense against United States anti-discrimination laws,95 as a defense to a
breach of a collective bargaining agreement,96 and as a defense to a
wrongful discharge action9 7 . No court has relied on the defense, but sev-
eral courts have recognized the appropriateness of applying the defense if
a foreign government actually compelled the conduct giving rise to liabil-
ity in the United States.9" The 1985 amendments of the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act,99 which extended jurisdiction of the statute
extraterritorially, l° ° incorporate a foreign compulsion defense. More-
93 U.C.C. § 2-615 (1987).
94 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 441 comment b.
95 Bryant, 502 F.Supp. at 490; EEOC Decision, 2 Emp. Prac. Guide at 7052.
96 TACA, 748 F.2d at 971.
97 McGhee, 87 F.2d at 1419.
98 Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1986); Pfeiffer v. W.M,
Wrigley Co., 755 F.2d 554, 559 (7th Cir.1985); Bryant, 502 F.Supp. at 490-91.
99 Hereinafter ADEA.
100 Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub.L. 98-459, § 802(b)(1), 98 Stat. 1792; 29
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over, the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission '0 1, while not spe-
cifically invoking the defense by name, has applied a foreign compulsion
analysis to exempt a corporation from liability under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act1 ° 2.
In order to more accurately analyze the proper application of the
defense to specific employer-employee disputes this comment first briefly
discusses the principles developed in the foregoing section as they apply
to employment law issues generally.
L Employment Law and Teritoriality
Courts have traditionally narrowly construed employment laws to
preclude extraterritorial application.103 Employment activities have been
traditionally characterized as "predominantly local."' 4 Nations have a
legitimate interest in maintaining control over employment practices as a
means of minimizing interference with local customs or economic regula-
tions.105 Under principles of international law, therefore, transnational
corporations must respect social and cultural traditions of the countries
in which they operate. 10 6 In limited instances courts have justified appli-
cation of United States law against U.S. companies operating abroad to
protect the legitimate interests of U.S. employees working overseas,107
although some courts have questioned these applications in the absence
of express legislative intent.108
U.S.C.A. § 623(f)1 (West 1985); Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 559. For a discussion of the extraterritorial
application of the ADEA see Zanar, Recent Amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 165, 186-190 (1985).
101 Hereinafter EEOC.
102 EEOC Decision, 2 Emp. Prac. Guide at 7052.
103 See supra note 4; Boureslan v. Arabian American Oil Co., 857 F.2d 1014, 1017 (5th Cir.
1988), cert granted, 111 S.CL 40 (1990) (Title Vii does not apply extraterritorially); Pfeiffer, 755
F.2d at 556-557 (Pre-amendment ADEA does not apply extraterritorially); cf. Bryant, 502 F.Supp.
at 482 (Title VII does apply extraterritorially).
104 Note, Equal Employment Opportunities for Americans Abroad, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1288, 1321
(1987). See also supra note 4.
105 U.N DEP'T. OF INT'L & SoCIAL AFFAIRS, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DE-
VELOPMENT AT 44, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/190, U.N. Sales No. E.73.II.A.11 (1973) ("[F]oreign con-
trol of key sectors by multinational corporations is regarded in many quarters as a serious
infringement upon political independence, and even sovereignty itself.").
106 U.N. Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, U.N. Commission on Transna-
tional Corporations: Report on Special Session, U.N. Doc. E/1983/17/ Rev. 1 (1983), Art. 12. See
also Note, supra note 104, at 1323-24.
107 Under the principle of nationality a state may prescribe law relating to the conduct of its
nationals, even when that conduct occurs outside of the state's territorial boundaries. RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 3, § 402 comment e. See Bryant, 508 F. Supp. at 482; Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1021
(King, J., dissenting).
108 See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1020; Wrigley, 755 F.2d at 556.
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This presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction over employ-
ment conduct mandates strict adherence to territorial principles when
conflicts between the United States and the jurisdiction of a host country
arise."°9 Exceptions to territoriality, arguably appropriate in areas such
as antitrust law where an entity may intend activity in another country to
have a specific effect on markets within the United States, should nor-
mally hold no force in an employment law context where the activity at
issue is usually limited in effect.11
When employment activity crosses international boundaries courts
usually resolve conflicts through adherence to the principle that a coun-
try may only prescribe activity that occurs within its borders. The prob-
lem of transnational employment frequently arises within the
transportation industry, or in cases where an employer engages in hir-
ing activity within the United States for overseas positions112. For in-
stance, when an employer engages in hiring activity within the United
States, foreign compulsion doctrine may require that the hiring take
place in accordance with United States law, but possibly subject to re-
strictions of the country in which the employee will be working.113 The
mere fact that a person will work abroad does not exempt a United States
employer from United States law. The good faith standard, as developed
throughout this comment, places the burden on the employer to prove
that only the law of a host country influenced its hiring policies, and not
any improper motive. Although a court may resolve most cases through
the use of this standard, where employment activity fails to fit into a
territorial scheme, conflicts in jurisdiction may best be resolved through
diplomatic channels.114
2. Employment Law and "Actual" Compulsion
When the United States has valid jurisdiction over the extraterrito-
rial employment conduct of its nationals, the unique nature of the em-
ployer-employee relationship warrants close scrutiny of the employer's
conduct. The interdependent nature of the employer-employee relation-
ship requires that courts consider issues of fairness to both the employer
109 See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
110 See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
111 See TACA, 748 F.2d at 533; text infra notes 138-143.
112 McGhee, 871 F.2d at 1414 (Contract executed in Texas for employment in Saudi Arabia); see
infra notes and accompanying text. See also, Abrams, 805 F.2d at 530 (Doctors applied for training
program in Saudi Arabia, while located in Texas).
113 EEOC Decision, 2 Emp. Prac. Guide at 7054.
114 This is likely to happen in the transportation area, where employment activity occurs in sev-
eral countries. In such cases, intergovernmental agreements may be the best method of regulating
employment conduct. See TACA, 748 F.2d at 968-69; infra notes 138-156 and accompanying text.
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and employee. The good faith standard as developed in Part II of this
comment remains the best means of balancing these two interests. The
good faith standard ensures that the employer makes an affirmative effort
to shield employees from the adverse effects of a foreign state order.115
This comment now turns to a discussion of the use of the good faith
standard in the three employment related areas where the defense has
been invoked.
B. Past and Future Application of Foreign Compulsion to
Employment Law
Application of the foreign compulsion defense to United States em-
ployment law has met with mixed results. A foreign compulsion analysis
based on a good faith standard has been implicitly adopted as a defense
to liability under Title VII. Courts in other contexts have adopted the
common fallacies surrounding the doctrine, thereby preventing proper
application of the foreign compulsion principle to employment issues.
This section first discusses the application of the defense under Title VII
in order to provide an example of proper foreign compulsion analysis.
The remainder of the section discusses foreign compulsion when invoked
as a defense to a breach of a collective bargaining agreement and as a
defense to a wrongful discharge action, two areas where courts have
failed to engage in a proper analysis of the defense. In order to promote
the future legitimate application of the defense as a useful tool for solving
jurisdictional disputes, the comment concludes with a brief discussion of
how consistent future application will lead to a more equitable interna-
tional business environment.
L Title VII and the*Foreign Compulsion Defense
In many instances the laws of the country in which an employer
operates may require gender, religion, or nationality based discrimina-
tion" 6, and therefore may violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act" 7 .
Authorities have recognized that the decision to process a case against an
115 See infra notes 134-138 and accompanying text.
116 This is particularly true in Arab nations such as Saudi Arabia where discriminatory practices
based on religion and gender are common. Kern v. Dynalectron, 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex.
1983) (Saudi law requiring Moslem pilot to fly into Mecca); Abrams, 805 F.2d 1136. In addition to
Title VII, hiring practices for employment in Arab countries may be regulated by the Antiboycott
provisions of the Export Administration Act which prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion
against any United States individuals or corporations. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (a)(1)(b)(1982). See
Abrams, 805 F.2d at 532 n.4; Jewish M.D. is Denied Arabic Employment, 178 Labor L. Rep. (CCH)
No. 351, (March 7, 1989). Courts have found a foreign compulsion applicable as a defense to the
EAA for activity occurring completely within the foreign country. See Bechtel, 1979-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 62,429 (Injunction preventing company from entering or implementing provision in con-
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employer operating overseas might involve issues that go beyond the no-
tion of the traditional employee-employer relationship.' 18  These con-
cerns raise the issue of whether it would be appropriate to apply Title VII
to overseas employment conduct in the face of conficting foreign laws. 19
Several courts and the EEOC have implicitly accepted the foreign
compulsion defense against liability under Title VII.12° According to the
EEOC, in order for an employer to invoke the defense of foreign compul-
sion, "the employer must have a current, authoritative, and factual basis
for its belief, and it must rely upon that belief in good faith. Otherwise,
the Commission will view the employer's proffered reason for rejecting
the individual as pretextual."121
Relying on this standard the EEOC found that rejecting a female
applicant for a position of air traffic controller in a foreign county did not
amount to unlawful sex discrimination when the laws and customs of the
host nation prohibited the employment of females in jobs where there
was contact with the opposite sex. 122 The EEOC stressed that the de-
fendant utilized procedures providing ample evidence of good faith reli-
ance on the government order. The employer accepted the plaintifi's
tract for boycott of any United States persons, as subcontractor in the United States, but permitting
company to enter such agreements outside the United States if required by foreign law).
117 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 (as amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 1978)).
118 Policy Statement, supra note 2, at 6065. See also supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text.
119 See supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text. Courts have accepted that Title VII applies
as long as the hiring activity takes place within the United States. See Abrams, 805 F.2d at 531;
Fernandez v. Wynn Oil, 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981). However, it is uncertain whether Title VII
applies to conduct which occurs entirely outside of the United States. The EEOC as well as several
courts have found that legislative history reveals a Congressional intent to include the employment
of United States citizens by United States corporations overseas within the scope of Title VII. Policy
Statement at 6064; Bryant, 502 F. Supp. at 481-483, rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562; Love v.
Pullman, 12 Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11,225 (D. Col. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1074
(10th Cir. 1978). As of this writing, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to the most recent
case addressing this issue. In this case the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in an en banc
decision has held that the lack of clear congressional intent precludes the application of Title VII to
purely extraterritorial activity. Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1019-1020, as adopted en banc, 892 F.2d 1271
(5th Cir. 1990), cert granted, EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S.Ct. 40 (1990). Commenta-
tors are also split on this issue. See Note, supra note 104, at 1291; Comment, The Multinational
Corporation and Employment Discrimination: A Strategy for Litigation, 16 U.S.F. L. REV. 491, 502-
506 (1982) (Congressional intent allows for extraterritorial application); cf. Kirschner, The Extrater-
ritorial Application of the Civil Rights Act, 34 LABOR LAW J. 394, 407 (1983). (Application of Title
VII extraterritorially, "may enmesh the United States and its business community in a foreign rela-
tions quagmire").
120 Bryant, 502 F. Supp. at 490; EEOC Decision, 2 Emp. Prac. Guide at 7054.
121 EEOC Decision, 2 Emp. Prac. Guide at 7054.
122 Id. The identity of the host country was not cited in the EEOC opinion in order to retain the
confidentiality of the parties to the charge, as well as the identity of the host country as required by
section 706(b) and section 709(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. et seq. See EEOC Decision, 2
Emp. Prac. Guide at 7056 n.6.
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application, and submitted it to the host country for approval. 123 Addi-
tionally, the employer notified the plaintiff of the host country restric-
tions, and processed her application pursuant to normal business
procedures. The EEOC also noted that the evidence showed that the
host country would not permit foreign companies to disregard laws
against the commingling of the sexes. Moreover, even if the host country
issued a work permit to a woman, the host country could still deport her,
and subject her employer to sanctions under the host country's law.124
Two federal courts have undertaken a similar analysis in evaluating
the validity of a foreign compulsion claim. 125 In Bryant v. International
School Services,1 26 the plaintiffs claimed that the hiring policy of the de-
fendant, a United States corporation which operated schools in Iran for
the benefit of children of American citizens employed in Iran, unlawfully
discriminated on the basis of sex because it resulted in a disproportionate
number of lower paying jobs going to married women.' 27 The defendant,
International School Services, 128 invoked a foreign compulsion defense
123 Id. at 7054.
124 Id. The EEOC, rather than invoking the foreign compulsion defense by name, relied on a
pragmatic interpretation of Title VII to conclude that respondent's actions did not violate Title VII
because its behavior was based not on the sex of the defendant, but on the law of the host nation.
Even though the results are the same, a more explicit foreign compulsion analysis seems to be prefer-
able to the position taken by the EEOC. Foreign compulsion, as its name implies, applies only when
such preferences are compelled by a foreign government. The Commission's analysis obscures the
real reason that liability was not justified, by implying that third party preferences may generally be
a legitimate defense. This downplays an important distinction between public and private action. It
is well established that a party cannot escape the net of Title VII by arguing that discriminatory
behavior was based on the discriminatory preferences of private individuals in a foreign country. See
Fernandez, 653 F.2d at 1273 (foreign customer preference cannot provide defense against Title VII
liability based on theory of business necessity).
125 Bryant, 502 F. Supp. at 481; Abrams, 805 F.2d at 533.
126 Id. at 483. In Bryant the plaintiff presented a prima facie case of sex discrimination based
on a disparate impact theory. In a disparate impact case a plaintiff must carry the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Under a disparate impact theory, plaintiffs make
out a prima facie case by establishing (i) that they belonged to a protected class (in this case women),
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and (ii) the policies of the corporation had
the effect of discriminating against that class. Id.
127 The defendant awarded its teachers two different employment contracts providing for sub-
stantially different benefits based on whether the teacher was hired within the United States and
brought to Iran, or whether the teacher was already in Iran for some independent purpose. This
practice resulted in a disproportionate number of lower paying, local-hire contracts, going to mar-
ried women. ISS explained its policy on the grounds that Iranian law prohibits an ISS employee
from receiving extra benefits which his/her spouse were already receiving through another employer.
The court held that the dual employment contracts, as mandated by both business reality and Ira-
nian law, did not violate Tite VII. The court however, did find that "[the defendant's] method
[emphasis added] of implementing this valid policy had the effect of discriminating against the plain-
tiffs on the basis of sex, and that ISS failed to articulate any reason, much less a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason, for this method." Id. at 487.
128 Hereinafter ISS.
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and claimed that Iranian law prohibiting the payment of certain benefits
to an employee if the employee's spouse also worked in Iran mandated
the defendant's conduct. The court found that the defendant violated
Title VII, not because of the policy against the payment of double bene-
fits, but because the defendant failed to advise its teachers of its hiring
criteria.12 9 The court found that it was this failure to advise that created
the discriminatory impact against married women. 130 Therefore, the evi-
dence could not support a finding that the discriminatory activity was
compelled.
In Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine,131 two anesthesiologists
brought a Title VII action claiming they were denied participation in a
medical school program at a Saudi Arabian hospital because they were
Jewish. The court implied that defendants could have escaped liability
upon a showing that the Saudi Arabian government prohibited the em-
ployment of the plaintiffs because they were Jewish.132 The court, how-
ever, could find no evidence that the Saudi authorities compelled the
defendant's activity. In order to escape liability "Baylor would have to
prove that the official position of the Saudi government forbade or dis-
couraged the participation of Jews in the program." 133 The court found,
however, that Baylor officials unilaterally undertook the exclusionary
practices. No evidence showed that Baylor officials took any appropriate
steps to determine the actual policy of Saudi Arabia towards Jews partic-
ipating in the program. Moreover, Baylor took no steps to alleviate or
129 This failure to inform prevented a married teacher from establishing her qualifications for a
higher paying contract, if her primary purpose for being in Iran was, in fact, to teach at the ISS
school. If the teacher's spouse worked for an American company in Iran, ISS assumed that the
teacher's primary purpose for being in Iran was not to teach at ISS but to accompany the spouse. Id.
at 490.
130 Id.
131 805 F.2d at 528.
132 Id. at 533. The court stated that a bonafide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") defense
might be available upon such a showing. Religion has been held to be a legitimate BFOQ in one
other instance involving the application of Title VII in Saudi Arabia. Kern, 577 F.Supp. at 1196.
The EEOC, however, has rejected the use of a BFOQ defense in the context of foreign discrimina-
tory laws and has expressed a preference for a foreign compulsion type analysis. EEOC Decision, 2
Emp. Prac. Guide at 7055 n.2. ( defense of BFOQ did not apply because the respondent failed to
allege that the charging party did not have the ability to do the job on the basis of her sex). See also
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1984)(sex as a bfoq). A foreign compulsion analysis seems to be preferable in an
international context because it deals specifically with the problem at hand, namely the discrimina-
tory laws of the host nation. For instance in EEOC Decision, the reason a woman was not qualified
for the job had nothing to do with the nature of the job itself, but only with the nation in which the
job was located. 2 Emp. Prac. Guide at 7055 n.2. Moreover, the use ofa BFOQ defense may collide
with the anti-discrimination provisions of the Export Administration Act. Abrams, 805 F.2d at 533
n.7. Under either doctrine the fairness justifications are similar.
133 Abrams, 805 F.2d at 533.
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rectify the effects of any perceived discriminatory practices and policies
on the part of the Saudis. 134
Principles of fairness, as developed within Title VII jurisprudence
discussed above, require that a court excuse a United States company
from liability only upon a showing that the employer reasonably believes
that the host country law mandates the discriminatory action. This stan-
dard promotes fairness to both employer and employee because it insures
that an employer may not rely upon mere conjectures or stereotypes
about the policies of the host country, but protects the employer from
liability when faced with real foreign government imposed restrictions. 135
An employer must justify its actions by making affirmative steps to deter-
mine the policy of the host nation before any violation of United States
law occurs, thereby lessening the ability of an employer to invoke the
defense ex post facto. While imposing liability in the face of true compul-
sion is manifestly unfair,136 imposing a burden on the corporation to
show that it actually thought such compulsion existed does not seem un-
fair, especially given the need to protect United States employees from
potential unfairness resulting from foreign government actions.
The analysis courts utilize in Title VII cases may apply more
broadly to a variety of employment issues. Generally, in order for an
employer to successfully invoke the defense, it must possess evidence
supporting its belief in the existence of a foreign law or order, and inform
the employee of the possible adverse effects the foreign law may have on
potential employment relationships. Such a communication demon-
strates that the employer was aware of the foreign law, and that it acted
in good faith compliance with that law. A failure to warn employees as
to the existence of the foreign law indicates either that the defendant (1)
was unaware of the law at the time the activity in question took place and
therefore did not act under true compulsion, or (2) knew of the law, but
did not base its behavior on that law.'37 Absent other sufficient evidence
of a government order, however, the mere warning of an employee as to
134 Id. The EEOC in adopting its standard specifically contrasted the behavior of the respondent
before the Commission with the behavior of the defendant in Abrams. EEOC Decision, 2 Emp.
Prac. Guide at 7054 n.5; cf. Abrams, 805 F.2d at 535.
135 See EEOC Decision, 2 Emp. Prac. Guide at 7054.
136 Id.
137 For instance, in EEOC Decision, 2 Emp. Prac. Guide at 6581, the fact that the defendant
company advised the charging party of the restrictive employment laws, and that such laws did in
fact exist, demonstrates that the defendant's behavior was based on good faith compliance with that
law. See supra notes 122-125 and accompanying text. Cf Bryant 502 F.Supp. at 488 (Failure to
advise plaintiffs that employment policy was based on an Iranian prohibition against payment of
double benefits, precluded invocation of a foreign compulsion defense). See supra notes 127-130 and
accompanying text.
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the potential existence of such an order does constitute evidence of good
faith compulsion.
138
The treatment of the foreign compulsion defense under Title VII has
created a workable doctrine which may serve as a model for the applica-
tion of the foreign compulsion defense in other areas of employment law
where the doctrine has not yet fully developed. This comment now turns
to a discussion of these areas.
2. Foreign Compulsion and Collective Bargaining Agreements
One defendant has invoked the foreign compulsion defense in an
attempt to escape its collective bargaining agreement obligations exe-
cuted within the United States and required under United States law. In
Airline Pil. Ass'n. Etc. v. TACA International Airlines139 the defendant,
TACA Airlines, a corporation under the laws of El Salvador, 4 ° claimed
an intergovernmental agreement between the United States and El Salva-
dor, as well as the El Salvador constitution, required that the airline
move its base of operations from the United States to El Salvador141.
The airline further claimed that the foreign compulsion defense ex-
cused its breach of a collective bargaining agreement.142 The court re-
fused the defense and issued an injunction against the airline. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Ciruit evaluated the validity
of the foreign compulsion claim by balancing the policy interests of both
El Salvador and the United States. 4 3  The court found that since collec-
tive bargaining agreements "are a cornerstone of our national labor pol-
138 See Abrams, 805 F.2d at 533; supra notes 131-134 and accompanying text.
139 748 F.2d 965.
140 TACA airlines was incorporated under the laws of El Salvador with 4/5ths of its stock con-
trolled by El Salvadorans. Id. at 967.
141 Since 1968 TACA and the union had executed successive collective bargaining agreements as
required under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1990). On December 20, 1983, dur-
ing negotiations for the continuation of the current collective bargaining agreement, El Salvador
adopted a new constitution which provided that Salvadoran public service companies would have
their base of operation in El Salvador. The next day officials from the Salvadoran Ministry of Labor
ordered TACA to move its pilot base to El Salvador. TACA then immediately notified its pilots that
the pilot base would be moved to El Salvador, that new individual employment contracts were to be
executed, and that the union would no longer be recognized as the pilot's bargaining agent. In
response the union petitioned for injunctive relief. The district court subsequently entered a tempo-
rary restraining order, and eventually a permanent injunction, prohibiting TACA from relocating its
base, unilaterally changing terms of employment, recruiting replacement pilots and interfering with
the pilots choice of the union as their bargaining agent. Id. at 967-968.
142 The airlines also claimed its actions were justified by the Air Transportation Agreement be-
tween the United States and El Salvador, and that the act of state doctrine precluded inquiry into the
controversy. Id. at 967.
143 Id. at 971.
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icy," 144 neither the act of state doctrine nor the foreign compulsion
defense barrred the injunction. The court made it clear, however, that its
conclusion did not "denigrate the interest of El Salvador or minimize its
participation in this dispute.""14 The court recognized that El Salvador
had ordered a corporate national to comply with its constitution, and
stressed that the holding did not prevent TACA from relocating its pilot
base, but only required that relocation must follow applicable United
States labor law.146
The court in TACA, by balancing the interests of the two nations,
fell into the common doctrinal trap which has hindered the devolpment
of the foreign compulsion defense.147 A balancing process lacks certainty
and implicitly violates the act of state doctrine.148 A balancing ap-
proach, while perhaps reaching the correct analysis in any given case,
proves inadequate because it prevents the development of a coherent
doctrine.
Under an analysis based on fairness to the defendant the court may
have resolved this case without the court balancing the interests of the
two nations. The facts of the case demonstrate that the defendant lacked
good faith justification for breaching the collective bargaining agreement,
because nothing in the El Salvadoran order prevented it from honoring
its collective bargaining obligations. 149 The court's focus on the interests
of the respective governments obscured the real issue: whether the for-
eign nation actually compelled the defendant's actions.
The weakness of a balancing approach, while not apparent in a case
such as TACA where actual compulsion is absent, may be demonstrated
in cases where true compulsion may actually exist. Consider a situation
where El Salvador required that the airline move to El Salvador, and El
Salvadoran law additionally prohibited union representation of the pilots
in El Salvador. 150 In this hypothetical situation, a court's mere assertion
144 d at 972.
145 Id. at 971.
146 Id. at 972.
147 See supra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
148 See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
149 El Salvador only ordered the Airlines to move its base of operations, it did not order a breach
of collective bargaining obligations. TACA, 748 F.2d at 972.
150 Such a situation arose in an earlier case involving litigation between TACA and the pilot's
union. See Ruby v. TACA, 439 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1971). In that case, TACA began relocation
efforts at the request of the El Salvadoran government. The district court granted the union injunc-
tive relief from the relocation on the grounds that El Salvadoran law prohibited the collective bar-
gaining agreement. While the court did not address the issue directly, it seems that Ruby involved
less than true compulsion because the relocation was instituted upon the request, not on the com-
mand of the El Salvadoran government. The fact that fourteen years later the airline still had its
base in New Orleans indicates that it was not under such compulsion to move in 1969. The hypo-
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that United States collective bargaining policies held more importance
than the policies of El Salvador would not prove determinative of the
foreign compulsion claim."'
The application of traditional territorial principles would better re-
solve such a problem. Under the general rule, "a state may require a
person of foreign nationality to do an act in that state even if it is prohib-
ited by the law of the state of which he is a national ... "152 In the
above hypothetical, the act sought to be proscribed, namely compliance
with the collective bargaining agreement, occurred within the United
States since at the time the dispute arose the pilot base and the collective
bargaining agreement existed within the United States153 Therefore, El
Salvador would merely exist as the state of nationality, and hence unable
to force the airline to breach its agreement in the United States.
Under a territorial analysis, the United States collective bargaining
agreements apply not because of the importance of United States labor
policies, but because of the interest the United States has in prescribing
conduct within its borders. In this hypothetical, given the predominant
interest which a host nation has in enforcing its labor laws, a United
States court could justifiably present the airline with either the choice of
withdrawing from the United States market completely, or complying
with domestic labor laws, in return for allowing it to fly within the
United States. The determination of such a purely territorial interest
does not exceed the scope of judicial power or expertise.154
While such an outcome may create substantial hardship for an air-
line and its employees, under the foreign compulsion analysis the burden
of protecting the interests of nationals rests on the country of nationality.
Just as the laws of the United States cannot trump the laws of another
nation within the other nation's territory,'55 another nation cannot en-
force its laws to compel one of its nationals to violate United States law
within the United States 56 .
thetical presented here assumes a situation where such relocation would be required under threat of
immediate sanctions.
151 See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
152 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 441(2)(a).
153 See TACA, 748 F.2d at 965.
154 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 441.
155 See, eg., EEOC Decision, supra note 15, at 7052.
156 See supra note 16. Traditional principals of jurisdiction place the burden on the country of
nationality to allow compliance with the foreign law. In other words, if El Salvador wants the air-
lines base within its country and it wants to enable its company to stay in business in the United
States it must allow compliance with United States law. The inherent difficulty faced by the corpora-




3. Foreign Compulsion and Wrongful Discharge Actions.
A defendant has most recently invoked the foreign compulsion de-
fense in an attempt to escape liability from a claim of wrongful discharge.
The plaintiffs, former employees of the defendant Arabian American Oil
Co. ("ARAMCO"), in Saudi Arabia, brought suit for wrongful discharge
pursuant to an employment contract, executed in Texas, and governed by
Texas law. 157 The plaintiffs claimed that ARAMCO violated terms of
the employment contract incorporating a Saudi labor law requirement
that employees could only be terminated for a valid reason. Conversely,
ARAMCO claimed that plaintiffs had engaged in illegal commercial ac-
tivity within the ARAMCO compound, and that ARAMCO had fired
the plaintiffs and confiscated their property under the compulsion of
Saudi government officials.158
The plaintiffs admitted operating a commercial business without a
license on the ARAMCO compound in violation of Saudi law. Evidence
suggested that ARAMCO knew of plaintiffs conduct prior to the Saudi
Government action, and knew of its probable illegality under Saudi law.
ARAMCO, however, did nothing to warn its employees of their viola-
tions. Instead, the company, having knowledge of the illegal activity,
solicited advice from the Saudi chief of police and requested that
ARAMCO be allowed to handle the matter internally. Saudi authorities
agreed to let ARAMCO take care of the matter, provided ARAMCO
terminated the plaintiffs' position in Saudi Arabia and repatriated the
plaintiffs to the United States.1 59
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in its
refutation of defendant's foreign compulsion claim demonstrated the
confusion and uncertainty which has plagued the defense. While it ap-
pears doubtful that a proper analysis of the defense would have exempted
157 McGhee, 871 F.2d at 1414-15. Plaintiffs also brought claims based on defamation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and conversion, giving rise to potential question of the applicability
of the defense to traditional common law tort claims. Questions which are beyond the scope of this
article.
158 See id. at 1415. ARAMCO also claimed that under the terms of the contract incorporating
Saudi law, the orders of the Saudi official constituted a valid reason for dismissal. An expert on
Saudi law testified before the district court that direction by government authorities to terminate the
contract constituted a valid reason for dismissal under Saudi law. The jury, however, found that
ARAMCO lacked a valid reason for dismissal, and that ARAMCO's conduct was not compelled by
the Saudi officials. The district court granted judgment NOV for ARAMCO on the grounds that the
jury lacked reasonable basis for concluding that ARAMCO fired the plaintiffs without reasonable
justification. The Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed, concluding that the jury could have
reasonably found that the company lacked a valid reason for terminating the plaintiffs. Id. at 1415-
1417.
159 IdL at 1415.
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ARAMCO from liability, the court's analysis further confused the de-
fense, thereby possibly hindering future application when appropriate.
The court confused the foreign compulsion defense with the act of
state doctrine, thereby causing it to make three erroneous rejections of
the defense. First, the court reasoned that the central purpose of the
doctrine was to avoid "passing on the validity" of foreign government
acts.16 This analysis obscured the central issue implicated in any case of
potential foreign compulsion, namely, whether a court may fairly impose
liability on an employer for acts mandated by a foreign government.
Second, relying on this mistaken interpretation of the defense, the
court stated that cases involving international contract disputes rarely
implicated the purposes of the foreign compulsion doctrine. 161 The court
reasoned that an award of damages in a breach of contract action only
implied that the corporation contracted to bear the risk of foreign com-
pulsion and did not implicate the legality of the foreign government
action. 162
A breach of contract question does not preclude a foreign compul-
sion analysis. Both the RESTATEMENT 163 and the Uniform Commercial
Code' 16 recognize that the order of a foreign government may exempt a
defendant from liability under a breach of contract charge.165  The
court's analysis eviscerates the doctrine because it implies that, absent
any other evidence, the mere doing of business in a foreign nation re-
quires a company to accept the risk of any liability arising under United
States law for acts compelled by a foreign government. By stating that
its decision only implicated the allocation of risk, the court implied that
ARAMCO contracted either explicitly or implicitly to bear the risk of
foreign government compulsion resulting from the illegal acts of its em-
ployees. However, the court presented no evidence which indicated
either an implicit or explicit assumption of that risk.
The court finally reasoned that the foreign compulsion defense failed
because where the legal standards of the foreign sovereign assess liability
160 Id See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
161 The court also implied that the defense is only available in the context of international anti-
trust disputes. McGhee, 871 F.2d at 1419 n.4.
162 McGhee, 871 F.2d at 1419.
163 § 441 comment e.
164 U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (1989).
165 Moreover, courts have established that a corporation may be excused from liability for a
breach of contract action when acting under orders of the United States government. See Eastern
Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas, 532 F.2d 957, 980 (5th Cir. 1976). The inability of United States
courts to inquire into the validity of foreign government acts provides even greater justification for
excusing breach when conduct is mandated by the foreign government rather than the United States.
See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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the purposes of the defense normally are not implicated.1 66 Accepting
this argument and applying it to the facts of the case leads either to a
clear misinterpretation of Saudi law, or an irreconcilable conflict within
Saudi law itself.167 This result demonstrates the inherent difficulty that a
United States court faces when interpreting the legal standards of a for-
eign nation.1 68 The court in McGhee stated that it applied Saudi legal
standards, but the only evidence before the court as to what those stan-
dards were seemed to point to an opposite result from that reached by
the court.
169
The court concluded that since liability was assessed under foreign
law standards the foreign sovereign probably could not have an interest
sufficient to justify the application of the foreign compulsion doctrine. 70
This argument ignores the fact that a foreign state has an interest in the
proper application of its laws. The limitations which the foreign compul-
sion and act of states doctrine impose, are not a function of the law being
applied, but are a function of who applies the law. Foreign compulsion
doctrine does not represent a traditional conflict of laws doctrine which
merely determines the applicable law. Rather, foreign compulsion at-
tempts to resolve jurisdictional conflicts in order to determine which
state can proscribe the conduct of the actor in question, regardless of
what legal standards apply.'71
McGhee represents the most recent United States federal court dis-
cussion of the foreign compulsion defense in any context and thus may
set dangerous precedent for the future. This proves particularly unfortu-
nate since the application of the good faith analysis, as developed in this
comment, would have yielded the same result without jeopardizing the
future application of the doctrine.
The principles developed throughout this comment, applied to the
facts of McGhee, suggest that ARAMCO failed to comply with the gov-
ernment order in good faith, and hence failed to show true compulsion.
The evidence before the court demonstrated that ARAMCO knew that
the Saudi directive giving rise to the termination of the plaintiffs resulted
166 McGhee, 871 F.2d at 1419.
167 The court found that liability could be applied under the portion of the contract incorporating
Saudi law which stated that an employee could only be terminated for a valid reason. An expert
witness testified that a government order constituted a valid reason for dismissal. Id. at 1419. If the
expert accurately interpreted Saudi law, ARAMCO, as a matter of Saudi law, did not violate the
employment contract because the order of the government official constituted a valid reason for
dismissal.
168 See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 159.
170 McGhee, 871 F.2d at 1419.
171 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 441.
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from an earlier failure of the company to follow the orders of Saudi
officials.
172
Since ARAMCO failed to comply with an earlier order which pre-
sumably would have prevented the plaintiffs' dismissal, ARAMCO can-
not argue that it merely followed the Saudi government's orders in good
faith. If not for its own inaction, the company would not have exper-
ienced any compulsion whatsoever, except to perhaps put an end to its
employees' illegal behavior. This, however, presumably would not have
forced ARAMCO to breach the employment contract. Moreover, as the
court inferred, compliance with the order did not mandate complete dis-
missal from the company; mere expatriation to the United States would
have sufficed to comply with the Saudi order. 173
IV. CONCLUSION
The foreign compulsion defense, ai developed above, should not op-
erate as a defense which allows a defendant to justify its behavior after it
commits the action giving rise to liability. Rather, it should operate as a
guide for proper employer behavior when faced with an order of a for-
eign government which may give rise to liability in the United States. An
employer which operates in foreign countries inevitably will run into
conflicting government mandates. In such a situation, it is unfair to im-
pose liability for factors beyond an employer's control. Nevertheless, the
fact that an employer operates overseas should not excuse a violation of
employee rights. Proper application of the foreign compulsion defense in
the cases outlined above prescribes the proper steps which a corporation
must take (1) to insure that actions are truly compelled, and (2) to limit
the harmful effects on employees resulting from compelled conduct.
The good faith compulsion defense takes into account the realities of
the international business world. It recognizes that employers and em-
ployees operating in a foreign country, in many instances, may find them-
selves subject to the whims of the host country. For this reason, the
important question is what the employer reasonably believes he must do
in order to comply with those whims. For this reason an inquiry into the
validity or the form of the foreign order does not create a workable doc-
172 In August 1983 the Saudi Deputy Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources sent
ARAMCO a specific directive outlawing all videotape activities and directing ARAMCO to instruct
its employees accordingly. ARAMCO failed to notify its employees that they were in violation of
Saudi law. The order requiring ARAMCO to dismiss the plaintiffs came on December 15, almost
five months after ARAMCO was informed of its obligation to instruct its employees, and after
ARAMCO itself informed Saudi officials of the ongoing violations. McGhee, 871 F.2d at 1415.




trine. 74 For example, under the facts of McGhee,171 if ARAMCO failed
to follow the orders of the Saudi government, its employees, as well as
ARAMCO itself, could have potentially faced criminal penalties under
Saudi law which would have exceeded either the harm caused to the
plaintiffs resulting from their dismissal, or the potential liability of
ARAMCO to plaintiffs for unlawful dismissal. The good faith standard
recognizes that sanctions under Saudi law may result regardless of the
validity of the Saudi order, i.e. regardless of whether the plaintiffs actu-
ally violated Saudi law. In such an instance an employee may be better
off as a result of their employer's good faith compliance with the foreign
government order.
The employer's resulting liability should arise not from its compli-
ance with the foreign government order, but from the harm caused to its
employees for its failure to follow government orders in good faith. Such
a failure may exist when a company relies on mere conjecture regarding
the foreign law requirements, 17 6 when a company fails to notify its em-
ployees of the operational law, 177 when a company's actions clearly ex-
ceed the foreign law's requirements,"7 ' or when evidence shows that the
company chooses to obey or disregard foreign orders as it sees fit 1 79 .
The foreign compulsion defense recognizes that in most instances
both the employer and employee will benefit from compliance with the
host country law, even if that law gives rise to liability in the United
States. The foreign compulsion defense, in the context of employer em-
ployee relations, deals only with the relationship which gives the United
States initial jurisdiction. When the United States exercises jurisdiction
over extraterritorial employment activity, its only valid claim to jurisdic-
tion stems from its desire to protect the interests and proscribe the con-
duct of its own citizens, whether employer or employee. Lacking
territorial authority, the United States only has interest in the employee-
employer relationship itself. Therefore, a court should only hold a
United States corporation operating abroad liable for the harm created
by the corporation's own independent action, not for the harm resulting
from the orders of a foreign government.
The foreign compulsion defense, properly applied, insures that, to
the extent possible under the law of the host country, employers treat
employees fairly, but does not protect the employee from unfair or dis-
174 See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
175 871 F.2d at 1415; supra notes 157-160 and accompanying text.
176 See Abrams, 805 F.2d at 533.
177 See Bryant, 502 F.Supp. at 472.
178 See TACA, 748 F.2d at 972.
179 McGhee, 871 F.2d at 1415.
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criminatory practices of the host country itself. The foregoing analysis
demonstrates the inherent limitations on the judicial branch when oper-
ating in an international context. Ultimately, as a judicially invoked doc-
trine, foreign compulsion fails to adequately protect United States
interests in the international business world. Many instances exist where
important United States policy interests may be thwarted as a result of
the defense's application.18 0 Diplomacy aimed at increasing interna-
tional cooperation can probably better accomplish such protection. The
principle of foreign compulsion, by recognizing the inherent tensions in-
volved in international employment which judicial doctrine cannot re-
solve, represents only a small step towards a more equitable international
business environment.
Michael A. Warner Jr.
180 For instance, commentators have recognized that under principles of international law, for-
eign compulsion would protect discriminatory employment activity mandated by apartheid in South
Africa, as long as the activity occurred completely within South Africa. Comment, supra note 120, at
509.
